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For Luther he was the "fool who wanted to turn the art of astronomy 
on its head"'; for Frangois Viete he was the paraphraser  of Ptolemy and 
"more a master of the dice than of the (mathematical) profession"2;  for 
nearly every intellectual in the century following De revolutionibus  Coper- 
nicus was a figure to be evaluated and criticized, if not always understood. 
Tycho  Brahe's critique of Copernicus is not summed up in any pithy 
statement but rather spread throughout his life's work. Yet it reveals the 
constant importance of Copernicus and his shortcomings as the point of 
departure for Tycho's own model and observations. 
Tycho  Brahe (1546-1601) was not  unusual in combining a certain 
admiration for Copernicus with a consistent rejection of heliocentrism. 
Beyond the  rather commonplace criticisms of  the  Copernican system 
based on physical, scriptural, and cosmological arguments, Tycho's pub- 
lished works and astronomical correspondence reveal countless attempts 
to disprove or discredit the Copernican hypothesis on empirical grounds. 
This criticism of Copernicus's parameters and observational practice, al- 
though less well known,3 is an integral part of, perhaps even a source for, 
Tycho's influential new agenda of "restoring"  astronomy through greater 
I would like to thank Noel Swerdlow, Anthony Grafton, Michael Mahoney, and Jean 
Ceard for helpful comments. 
"Der Narr will die ganze Kunst Astronomiae umkehren."  Martin Luther, Tischreden 
IV, no. 4630 (Weimar, 1916), as quoted in Noel Swerdlow and Otto Neugebauer, Mathe- 
matical Astronomy in Copernicus'  De Revolutionibus  (2 vols.; New York, 1984), I, 3. 
2 Frangois Viete, "Apollonius Gallus" (Paris, 1600) in Opera mathematica, 343, as 
quoted in Otto Neugebauer, "On the Planetary Theory of Copernicus," Astronomy and 
History: Selected Essays (New York, 1983), 491-505. 
3 Reference is made to certain of these arguments in Christine Schofield, Tychonic  and 
Semi-Tychonic World  Systems (New York, 1981), 37-39, and in Kristian Peder Moesgaard, 
"Copernican Influence on Tycho Brahe," Studia Copernicana,  V (Warsaw, 1973), 31-56. 
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observational accuracy and a more directly empirical derivation of plane- 
tary models. 
I. The development of Tycho's agenda 
In his first public reference to Copernicus, when lecturing on mathe- 
matics for a few months in 1574 at the University of Copenhagen, Tycho 
formulated what would remain his basic attitude toward the Copernican 
system.  He  hailed Copernicus as a  second Ptolemy,  praising him  for 
avoiding the mathematical absurdity  of the equant point and for "philoso- 
phizing more exactly than anyone before him" about the course of the 
stars. At  the same time he criticized the heliocentric hypothesis for its 
features that were "opposed to physical principles," the motion of the 
earth and immobility of the sun and of the sphere of the fixed stars.4  Tycho 
then promised that while abiding by the spirit and numbers (mentem et 
numeros) of Copernicus, he would reestablish the stability of the earth 
and show "how the appearances  of the other planets could be adapted to 
the stability of the earth, while the Copernican numbers stayed the same, 
and how this could be done differently from Peucer and Dasypodius" (I, 
173). Although Tycho clearly expressed praise for Copernicus's work and 
even a preference for the physical absurdities of heliocentrism over the 
"mathematical" absurdity of non-uniform circular motion in the Pto- 
lemaic system,5  he never doubted that Copernicus's  hypothesis was flawed. 
Throughout his writings Tycho would continue to display great admi- 
ration for Copernicus, whom he usually called ingens or incomparabilis 
(VI, 102; VII, 199, for example), citing above all his ingenuity and mathe- 
matical talent. Tycho devoted a prominent  portion of his book of published 
astronomical letters to a fulsome description, complete with poetic elegies 
of his own composition, of the mementos of Copernicus and other great 
astronomers which surrounded him in his workplace at Uraniborg. On 
his wall Tycho kept portraits of Timocharis, Hipparchus, Ptolemy, al- 
Bitruji, Alphonso X, and Copernicus, alongside those of himself and his 
young son Tychonides, whom he included in the pantheon in anticipation 
of  great work to  come.  Of Copernicus in  particular Tycho  cherished 
the parallactic instrument which an assistant had brought back from an 
observing expedition to Frauenburg and which was displayed at Urani- 
borg, accompanied  by a special ode. Once included amid the great astrono- 
mers of all time, however, Copernicus was not only owed deep respect, 
4 Tycho  Brahe, "De disciplinis mathematicis oratio" (1574), J. L. E. Dreyer (ed.), 
Opera omnia (14 vols.; Copenhagen, 1913-29), I,  149. Further references to the Opera 
omnia will be made by volume and page number in parentheses; all translations are my 
own. 
5 Tycho would continue to perceive Copernicus's motion of the earth as a lesser evil 
than Ptolemy's use of the equant point, as he does for example in a letter to Christoph 
Rothmann dated 1587 (VI, 102). Tycho Brahe's Critique  of Copernicus  357 
but was also open to that reverent yet critical examination characteristic 
of Copernicus's  own treatment of Ptolemy or of Vesalius's attitude toward 
Galen. 
As early as 1574 Tycho expressed his enthusiasm for what Copernicus 
had "restored" in astronomy only alongside his own call for astronomy 
to be further "restored," first by reestablishing the stability of the earth 
and later by  improving through better observation the  hypotheses of 
planetary motion. It is precisely to this "restoration" (redintegratio or 
restitutio)  that Tycho devoted the rest of his life and writings. The concept 
was not peculiar to Tycho but appeared  in the writings of many contempo- 
raries6  and can be recognized for example in Copernicus's preface to De 
revolutionibus,  in which he deplores the jumbled and monstrous state of 
astronomy.7  Rather than a return to any particular cosmological system 
or set of parameters, the term referred more loosely to an unspecified 
ideal astronomy from a mythical past, perfect in all respects. But while 
all sixteenth-century astronomers agreed that astronomy had to be re- 
stored, they differed on exactly which aspects of astronomy required  most 
attention. Tycho expressed his personal goal in a letter to Rothmann in 
August 1588: "I will endeavor to adapt my restorations [restitutiones]  in 
the  course of  all  the  planets to  my  own  hypothesis, not  one  already 
invented, and to show the agreement of computation with them and with 
the heavens themselves, and I have decided therefore to set them out in 
a special work, God willing" (VI, 147). 
Tycho's agenda at its maturity was thus two-fold, to find a new hypoth- 
esis, in particular one that avoided the absurdities of both the Ptolemaic 
and the Copernican systems, and to establish through observations its 
agreement  with the heavens themselves rather than with any given param- 
eters. While Tycho's lectures of 1574 already outlined the first part of this 
project, to reestablish the stability of the earth to the otherwise admirable 
Copernican system, they did not yet involve much criticism, like that 
implicit in the letter to Rothmann and explicit in so many other instances 
after 1578, of Copernicus's  observations  or parameters.  As Tycho recounts 
in his work on the comet of 1577, De mundi aetherei recentioribusphaeno- 
menis liber secundus,8  it was only in attempting to trace the course of the 
6 Charles Whitney suggests that Tycho's use of the related concept of an "instaurata 
astronomia" (renovated astronomy) was influential in Bacon's choice of title for his In- 
stauratio magna ("Francis Bacon's instauratio: Dominion of and over Humanity," JHI, 
50 [1989], 371). 
7 Nicolas Copernicus, De revolutionibus  orbium coelestium, facsimile reprint of  1543 
edition (New York and London, 1965), f. iij v. 
8 Brahe, De mundi aetherei recentioribus  phaenomenis liber secundus qui est de illustri 
stella caudata ab elapso fere triente Novembris Anni  1577, usque in finem Ianuarij se- 
quentis conspecta (Uraniborg, 1588), reprinted in  Opera omnia, IV,  also available in 
translation: Sur des phenomenes plus recents du monde ethere, tr. Jean Peyroux (Paris, 
1984). The work was already at least partially composed by 1578 (Schofield, 52). 358  Ann Blair 
comet that he first began to check Copernicus's parameters and to find 
them wanting. 
Tycho found that the positions of the stars in relation to which he 
would chart the comet's path corresponded neither to Ptolemy's nor to 
Copernicus's computations. Both had relied, Tycho concluded, on the 
tables of latitudes and longitudes established by Hipparchus and Ptolemy 
which involved errors of one degree or more.9 Tycho  attributed these 
errors to  "the carelessness (incuria) either of  the  observers or of  the 
transcribers or rather of both" (IV, 20). Before he could calculate the 
successive positions of the comet, Tycho's first task was to "restore to 
pristine condition" (in integrum restituere), from his own observations, 
the positions of all the stars he would use as points of reference. Tycho 
devoted the second chapter of De mundi recentioribus  phenomenis to his 
results, and thus initiated the second part of his  "restoration" project 
which would before long grow to include new and more reliable observa- 
tions for virtually all the celestial bodies. 
Whereas in  1574 Tycho  had been content  to  accept  Copernicus's 
"numbers," by  1578 he realized that he could no longer rely on them. 
Spurred  from then on by his dissatisfaction with both the parameters  and 
the hypotheses of Copernicus, Tycho strove toward a model which would 
satisfy the requirements  of mathematics, physics, and his own more accu- 
rate observations. By the mid-1580s Tycho had settled on his geoheliocen- 
tric model, first outlined in print in  1588.10  He offered it as the perfect 
compromise between the Scylla of Ptolemy and the Charybdis  of Coperni- 
cus  (IV,  473-74),  combining what  he  admired in  both  systems while 
avoiding the absurdities  of each. Meanwhile Tycho continued his exacting 
restoration of the motions of the celestial bodies throughout his life, and 
would use his numerous corrections to claim, with rhetorical rather than 
logical force, that his system alone could account exactly for the phe- 
nomena. 
Tycho never presented his system in final and fully argued form as he 
had hoped to some day in a Theatrum astronomicum," but his massive 
astronomical correspondence, available in three volumes of the  Opera 
omnia, offers a wealth of detail and debate from which  to  follow  his 
argument. The letters are dated between 1571 and a few months before 
his death in 1601, but most were written after the mid-1580s, once he had 
developed his own cosmological system and was comfortably installed 
with his observatories  and assistants on the island of Hveen.12  In keeping 
9 For Tycho's judgment of their relative merits, see below p. 18. 
10  De mundi aetherei recentioribus  phaenomenis liber secundus, ch. 8. 
1 Moesgaard, 40. 
12 The main building of Tycho's estate, the Uraniborg proper, served as both dwelling 
and workplace and was completed in 1580. It included a large library containing major 
instruments like the mural quadrant in use from 1582, and two small observatories. A 
separate observatory, the Stjerneborg, was built, largely beneath ground for protection 
from the wind, in  1584. Tycho  first set up his  own printing press in the same year. 
Tycho's first assistant arrived in  1578, then Paul Wittich in  1580; Gellius, Olsen, and Tycho Brahe's Critique  of Copernicus  359 
with the habits of late humanist scholars, Tycho corresponded  with serious 
astronomers throughout Europe employed in a variety of occupations.13 
These ranged from university professors of mathematics and/or medicine 
to the physicians and astronomers attached to imperial or princely courts, 
to officials and rulers in the Holy Roman Empire, who often cultivated a 
personal interest in  astronomy and measurement.14  Of the professors, 
some he had known while a student, like Caspar Peucer at Wittenberg 
and Henry Brucaeus at Rostock, others he knew only through letters and 
intermediaries,  like Giovanni Antonio Magini at the University of Bologna 
or Joseph Justus Scaliger at Leiden. Tycho carried on lively exchanges 
from Hveen with Thaddeus Hagecius, physician to the emperor in Bohe- 
mia and, after leaving Denmark in  1597, with his  assistant Johannes 
Kepler, and with Herwart von Hohenburg, chancellor of Bavaria, among 
others. Most importantly Brahe corresponded  regularly  between 1586 and 
1591 with Wilhelm IV, Landgrave of Hesse, whose observatory  at Kassel 
was a major center of astronomical activity, and with his court astrono- 
mer, Christoph Rothmann, a convinced Copernican. Tycho  published 
these letters to Kassel in  1596 as his Epistolarum astronomicarum  liber 
primus'5  but never carried out plans for publishing more of his correspon- 
dence. 
II. Tycho's assessment of heliocentrism 
In an important letter of  1588 to Caspar Peucer, Tycho presented 
most completely his perception of the shortcomings of Ptolemy which 
Copernicus had resolved: 
[In examining  the Ptolemaic  hypotheses]  I noticed  ...  that although  they save 
to a great  extent  the heavenly  appearances,  because  however  they allow  that the 
motion  of a circle  be regular  not around  its own center,  but around  some other 
point, they sin against  the first principles  of the art, which Copernicus  himself 
seems  to have criticized  in these  hypotheses;  furthermore  the great  number  and 
great  size of the epicycles  that are assumed  take up much space  in the sky and 
are superfluous.  I considered  whether  everything  could  be resolved  by fewer  [of 
them],  and  it gave  me great  concern  that  no necessary  cause  or natural  combina- 
Longomontanus are the better known of the pupils who worked at Hveen during the 1580s 
and 1590s. J. L. E. Dreyer, Tycho Brahe: A Picture of Scientific Life and  Work in the 
Sixteenth Century (New York, 1963), 94-104, 115-27. 
13 On the emergence  of a status of "scholar"  see Erich Trunz, "Der deutsche Spathuman- 
ismus um  1600 als Standeskultur," Richard Alewyn  (ed.), Deutsche Barockforschung: 
Dokumentation einer Epoche (Cologne, 1965), 147-81. 
14 See for example Bruce T. Moran, "Princes, Machines and the Valuation of Precision 
in the  Sixteenth Century," Sudhoffs Archiv, 61 (1977),  209-28, and "German Prince- 
Practitioners:  Aspects in the Development of Courtly Science, Technology, and Procedures 
in the Renaissance," Technology  and Culture, 22 (1981), 253-74. 
15 Brahe, Epistolarum astronomicarum liber primus (Uraniborg, 1596), reprinted as 
vol. VI of Dreyer's Opera omnia. 360  Ann Blair 
tion explained  why the superior  planets  are  bound  to the sun in such a way that 
at conjunction  they always  occupy  the top of their epicycles,  at opposition  the 
lowest  point  of the same,  and that the two planets  that  are  called  inferior  always 
have the same  mean  position  with the sun and are close to it at the apogee  and 
perigee  of their  epicycles.  (VII, 128) 
Tycho admires the Copernican system because he finds it far more elegant 
than the Ptolemaic (longe concinnior,  VII, 80). And, without considering 
for the moment the triple motion of the earth, Tycho finds that Copernicus 
"resolves well all the other aspects of the Ptolemaic arrangement which 
are confused and superfluous, and in no way sins against the principles 
of mathematics" (VII,  128). 
This appraisal of the advantages of the Copernican system was fairly 
common in the sixteenth century even among those who,  like Tycho, 
rejected heliocentrism because of the motion of the earth. Although wide- 
spread, it was not particularly accurate, however, as Copernicus's com- 
pleted model used no fewer circles than Ptolemy's. But in the skeleton of 
the Copernican model at least, the epicycle that Ptolemy had attributed 
to each individual planet could be accounted for by the single annual 
rotation of the earth. It  is no  doubt this conceptual simplicity which 
appealed to Tycho  and many contemporaries. Indeed Tycho probably 
rejected the Ptolemaic system in the first place and devised a system of 
his own precisely in order to preserve the explanatory power he found so 
attractive in Copernicus's heliocentrism. In the Tychonic system the mo- 
tion of the planets around the sun, while the sun revolved around the 
earth, still accounted for the stations and retrogradations of the planets 
which  had required the  epicycles in  the  Ptolemaic model.  But  when 
Tycho actually adjusted his theory to fit the parameters derived from his 
observations, as he did in the case of the moon for example, he too in the 
end had only added further epicycles to the existing models. 
In many instances, starting with his 1574 lecture, Tycho praised Co- 
pernicus for avoiding Ptolemy's "sin" against the "first" or the "mathe- 
matical" principles of the art. Like many before him, including Coperni- 
cus, Tycho objected here to Ptolemy's explicit use of non-uniform circular 
motion and what was later called the equant point-a  point around which 
the epicycle of a planet maintains a constant angular velocity even while 
it follows a path centered on a different point. But Copernicus no less 
than Ptolemy needed the planets in his model to move in a non-uniform 
circular motion, in order to approximate, quite successfully in fact, Ptole- 
my's own model. He did so more subtly than Ptolemy, however, through 
a combination of eccentric circles and epicycles, which yielded almost the 
same result as the problematic circle revolving around a point other than 
its center. 
The equivalence of Copernicus's eccentrepicyclic model to Ptolemy's 
equant point was not lost on some students of Copernicus, such as Michael Tycho Brahe's Critique  of Copernicus  361 
Maestlin and Kepler, who corresponded  on the subject. 
16 Tycho, however, 
never alluded to the problem in Copernicus and on the contrary praised 
the latter precisely for avoiding the mathematical absurdities of the Pto- 
lemaic system. He seemed satisfied with Copernicus's  more discreet model 
for producing non-uniform  circular  motion and in any case had no alterna- 
tive to offer. Tycho focused rather on those problems in the Copernican 
system which he felt he could resolve. 
Tycho's main objection to the Copernican system, and one that geohe- 
liocentrism avoided, concerned the motion of the earth. Tycho shows no 
sign of having speculated, as Copernicus did in De Revolutionibus  book 
I, about alternatives to Aristotelian physics that could accommodate a 
moving earth. The annotations in Tycho's copy of the De Revolutionibus, 
once taken as evidence for such speculation, have now been identified as 
those of Paul Wittich.17  Already in  1574 Tycho made it clear that the 
motion of the earth violated "physical principles" and could not be toler- 
ated.  In  1584, in  a  letter to  his  friend Henry Brucaeus, professor of 
medicine and mathematics at Rostock, Tycho expressed a rare moment 
of doubt. Of the three motions Copernicus had assigned to the earth, 
Tycho believed that he had disproved the annual motion by his measure- 
ment of the parallax  of Mars at opposition and had dismissed Copernicus's 
libration of the earth, added to account for the precession of the equinoxes, 
as both unnecessary and in any case based on inaccurate observations. As 
for the third, daily rotation of the earth, Tycho briefly wondered: 
But whether  this third  motion,  that accounts  for the daily  revolution,  belongs  to 
the earth and nearby  elements,  is hard to say. For with the same reason  the 
appearance  of so great  a motion  can  be explained  in the earth  and  in the  primum 
mobile  [the outermost  sphere]  and the sudden  return  from East to West of all 
the spheres  in the second  mover [beneath  the fixed stars]  can be saved  with a 
much  smaller  revolution,  and  therefore  a more  convenient  short-cut,  as I see that 
the Pythagoreans  and Platonists  believed.  (VII, 80) 
This was the extent of Tycho's consideration, however, as he immediately 
concluded: "It is likely nonetheless that such a fast motion could not 
belong to the earth, a body very heavy and dense and opaque, but rather 
belongs to the sky itself whose form and subtle and constant matter are 
better suited to a perpetual motion, however fast" (VII, 80).18  On other 
occasions Tycho dismissed the motion of the earth as useless (irritus, VI, 
27) and an absurdity (VI, 177; VII,  199). 
16 Anthony Grafton, "Michael Maestlin's Account of Copernican Planetary Theory," 
Proceedings of the American Philosophical  Society, 117 (1973), 523-50. 
17 Owen Gingerich and Robert S. Westman, The Wittich Connection: Conflict and 
Priority  in Late Sixteenth-Century  Cosmology,  Transactions of the American Philosophical 
Society, vol. 78, part 7 (Philadelphia, 1988), 23. 
18 For a similar discussion of the possibility of daily rotation see Tycho's letter to 
Kepler in 1598 (VIII, 45). 362  Ann Blair 
Tycho's  rejection  of the  motion  of the earth  rested  at times  on Aristote- 
lian  physics  and  his conviction  that  the earth  is a "lazy  and  ignoble"  body 
(piger  et ignobilior,  VII, 128)  whose  nature  does not lend itself  to motion, 
unlike the ethereal  substance  of the heavenly  bodies for whom motion, 
"however  fast,"  is natural.  At other  times  Tycho  reasoned  from  common 
sense,  adducing  in his responses  to Christoph  Rothmann  arguments  made 
famous  by Galileo's  dialogues:  that  if the earth  were  turning,  a canon-ball 
fired  in the direction  of the motion  of the earth  would  travel  farther  than 
one fired  in the opposite  direction  (VI, 219), or that a lead ball dropped 
from  a tower  would  fall  beyond  the  bottom  of the tower  (VI, 197).  Neither 
was original  with Tycho, who could have read them in the writings  of 
Caspar  Peucer,  for example.19 
In summarizing  his reasoning  for Peucer,  Tycho also reveals  the im- 
portance  of "the  unquestionable  authority  of the holy scriptures,"  which 
he cites as the second "obstacle  to the regular  and perpetual  revolution 
of the earth"  (VII, 129).20  Although  Tycho rarely  used this argument  in 
isolation,  he did take  it seriously,  and contrasted  the clear  position  of the 
Bible  on the motion  of the earth  with its silence  concerning  the reality  of 
celestial  spheres.  In the wake  of the comet of 1577  Tycho had taken  the 
novel  position  that  the orbs  carrying  the planets  had  no real  existence  and 
was thus particularly  interested  in anticipating  possible  objections  to his 
views based on the Bible. As Christine  Schofield  points out,21  Tycho 
concluded in his Astronomiae  instauratae  progymnasmata,22  that "neither 
scripture  nor  true  philosophy  will prove  that  the heavens  have  solid  orbs" 
(III, 151).  He based  this conclusion  not on the weakness  of the authority 
of scripture,  but rather  on the ambiguity  of the authoritative  texts, for 
while some passages  in the Bible seem to imply solid orbs, "there  are 
many  other  places  in the holy scripture  to the contrary  which show that 
the sky is something  very liquid and very fine" (III, 151). Tycho even 
made  the further  claim  that "the  very liquid  and permeable  substance  of 
the heavenly  world  can be proved  from  the sacred  writings"  (VI, 187).23 
In his debate  with Rothmann  on the motion of the earth,  however, 
Tycho found the Bible both literally authoritative  and unambiguous. 
Rothmann  argued,  much as Galileo would later in his "Letter  to the 
Grand  Duchess  Christina,"  that  the biblical  texts  that  seemed  to deny  the 
motion of the earth  were written  to accommodate  the understanding  of 
the common  man  and  could  not constitute  an objection  to the Copernican 
19 Schofield,  92. 
20  See also III,  175; VII, 199. 
21  Schofield, 90. 
22  Brahe,  Astronomiae  instaurataeprogymnasmata  quorum haec prima  pars de restituti- 
one motuum solis et lunae stellarumque inerrantium tractat et praeterea de admiranda 
nova stella Anno 1572 exorta luculenter agit (Prague, 1602), reprinted in Opera  omnia, II 
and III. The printing was begun at Uraniborg in 1588. 
23 See also IV, 474. Tycho Brahe's Critique  of Copernicus  363 
system, about which "we will know only as much as we find through 
mathematical  demonstrations"  (VI, 160).  Far from  being  convinced,  Ty- 
cho responded  so forcefully  that in his next letter he had to reassure 
Rothmann  that he had not meant  to accuse  him of impiety,  adding:  "I do 
not take it upon myself  to judge anyone's  piety or impiety"  (VI, 185). 
Tycho refused  to allow that the prophets,  even while addressing  the 
crowds,  might  have  spoken  untruths.  "The  authority  and  reverence  of the 
divine  scriptures  is and must be greater  than as if it were  appropriate  to 
treat them in the manner  of a play script. Granted  that in physics  and 
some other fields they adjust themselves  very well to the level of the 
crowd,  nonetheless  far  be it from  us to decide  that  they speak  in so vulgar 
a way that they do not also seem  to set out truths"  (VI, 177).  In using  a 
theory of accommodation  to dismiss  certain  of their statements,  Roth- 
mann "detracts  too much from the prophets  by saying that they did 
not understand  more about  the nature  of things than other vulgar  men. 
Although  they did not treat  of physics  by profession,  indeed  this was not 
the  nature  of their  gift,  nonetheless  they  mixed  many  physical  propositions 
in with their  prophecies,  which  no one, however  deeply  imbued  in natural 
philosophy,  could deny"  (VI, 177-78). 
Instead  of interpreting  the Bible  "more  freely"  as Rothmann  proposes, 
citing  Augustine  as an example  (VI, 181),  Tycho praises  contemporaries 
who study the physics  contained  in the scriptures.  Francisco  Valles,  for 
example,  "explained  many  things  which  must  not be neglected  among  the 
matters  of physics  contained  in the scriptures"  and Lambert  Daneau  is 
hailed  as "a very erudite  man and one who has done excellent  service  in 
educating  others"  for his "theological  physics"  drawn  from the old and 
new testaments.24  Tycho concludes:  "It is possible  that many  things  lurk 
here that should be explained  differently,  to follow a better system of 
physics-which is itself, perhaps,  to be found  to a considerable  extent  in 
scripture"  (VI, 185). 
Tycho's parting  challenge  to Rothmann  to "cite any text you have 
from  the holy oracles  or their  commentators  that  supports  the Copernican 
assertion"  (VI, 186)  is, on the one hand,  a rhetorical  ploy;  indeed  Tycho 
adds  immediately:  "I know  this well enough  that Augustine,  the only one 
you name,  never  conceded  the annual  or diurnal  motion  of the earth;  not 
being  much  of a mathematician,  he questioned  the very  roundness  of the 
earth  by denying  the antipodes"  (VI, 186).  But on the other  hand  it also 
grows  out of his conviction  that many  truths  of physics  are contained  in 
the holy scriptures.  If Tycho left to others the practice  of a scriptural 
physics, he remained  deeply committed  to the physical  truth of those 
24 Tycho is referring here to their recent works: Franciscus Valles, De is  quae scripta 
sunt physice in libris sacris, sive de Sacra Philosophia liber singularis (Lyon,  1588), and 
Lambert  Daneau, Physica Christiana,  sive de Rerum creatarum  cognitione  et usu, disputatio 
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biblical statements which entailed the stability of the earth. After this 
heated exchange with Rothmann, however, Tycho rarely discussed the 
issue, but focused instead on astronomical arguments against Copernicus. 
In the absence of any observed stellar parallax, Tycho  scoffed for 
example at the absurdity of the distance and the sizes of the fixed stars 
that the Copernican system required: 
Then the stars of the third magnitude  which are one minute  in diameter  will 
necessarily  be equal  to the entire  annual  orb [of the earth],  that is, they would 
comprise  in their  diameter  2284 semidiameters  of the earth.  They  will be distant 
by about  7850000  of the same semidiameters.  What will we say of the stars of 
first  magnitude,  of which some reach  two, some almost  three  minutes  of visible 
diameter?  and what if, in addition,  the eighth  sphere  were removed  higher,  so 
that  the annual  motion  of the earth  vanished  entirely  [and  was  no longer  percepti- 
ble] from  there?  Deduce  these things  geometrically  if you like, and you will see 
how many absurdities  (not to mention  others)  accompany  this assumption  [of 
the motion  of the earth]  by inference.  (VI, 197) 
Tycho also shared this misgiving with a number of contemporaries. He 
himself had searched repeatedly for any sign of a parallax in the sphere 
of the fixed stars, but to no avail (VIII, 209). The consequences, then, 
were simply too monstrous to be believable. Tycho stressed his conviction 
on this point in the Progymnasmata:  "It is necessary to preserve in these 
matters some decent proportion, lest things reach out to infinity and the 
just symmetry of creatures  and visible things concerning size and distance 
be abandoned:  it is necessary to preserve this symmetry because God, the 
author of the universe, loves appropriate order, not confusion and disor- 
der" (II, 435). 
There is nothing particularly unusual in Tycho's use of these three 
arguments against the Copernican system. The physical absurdity of the 
motion of the earth, confirmed by the enormous distance to the fixed stars 
and evidence from the Bible, sealed Tycho's rejection of heliocentrism. 
Schofield also suggests that Tycho's dissatisfaction with Copernican pa- 
rameters contributed to his "loss of confidence" in the new system;25  but 
from the chronology of Tycho's development it is clear that Tycho rejected 
the motion of the earth already in 1574, well before he had begun seriously 
to investigate the accuracy of Copernicus's numbers. Once he had started 
his vast observational project, however, Tycho discovered a whole new 
range of arguments with which to undermine the Copernican system. 
III. Two empirical "proofs" 
The first of Tycho's empirical arguments, from the observation of the 
parallax of Mars, might have been quite convincing had he been able to 
25 Schofield, 38. Tycho Brahe's Critique  of Copernicus  365 
sustain it. In his letter to Brucaeus of 1584 Tycho recounted how he had 
devised a simple empirical test of the Copernican  system. In the Ptolemaic 
system Mars is always further away from the earth than the sun. The 
Copernican model, however, places Mars at opposition closer to the earth 
than the sun is to the earth. Therefore a simple comparison of the paral- 
laxes of the sun and of Mars at opposition should determine conclusively 
which of the two systems is true, a smaller parallax of Mars disproving 
the  Copernican system. Tycho  reported that  at  the  end of  1582 and 
especially in 1583, "by most frequent and precise observations," he had 
found that the parallax of Mars was much smaller than that required by 
Copernicus; he  concluded that  "the whole  sphere of  Mars is  further 
removed from us than the sun" and "the annual motion of the earth in a 
great circle around the sun does not  exist" (VII,  80). Tycho  had not 
redetermined the solar parallax for this test, but used throughout his 
writings the Ptolemaic value of approximately  2'50", while the solar paral- 
lax actually does not exceed 9 seconds.26  Given the value he assumed for 
the solar parallax, his observation of a smaller parallax of Mars is perhaps 
not surprising. 
What is  startling, however, is the  further development of  Tycho's 
account of the parallax of Mars. In his letter of 1588 to Caspar Peucer, 
Tycho's description of the parallax test based on those same observations 
of  1582-83 and on the same value for the solar parallax, had changed 
drastically: 
And finally  with great  diligence  and  at no small  cost using  various  astronomical 
instruments  by which the movements  of the heavenly  bodies  can be measured 
accurately  not only to the minute,  but even  to the half or quarter  of a minute  of 
arc,  and  having  taken  many  such accurate  observations  at the rising,  setting  and 
meridian  transit  of Mars,  I found  that Mars  displays  a greater  parallax  than the 
sun and is therefore  closer to the earth  than the sun when it is in opposition, 
which is in agreement  with the Copernican  numbers.  (VII, 129;  my emphasis) 
This reversal has puzzled many commentators, starting with Kepler, 
who tried to justify it by attributing it to the error of Tycho's assistants, 
who had misunderstood their instructions.27  As J. L. E. Dreyer points 
out, however, Tycho's notes on the observation and the parallax calcula- 
26 J.  L.  E.  Dreyer,  "Note  on  Tycho  Brahe's Opinion About  the  Solar Parallax," 
Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical  Society, 71 (1910), 74-76. As Schofield points 
out (p. 70), in the Progymnasmata Tycho endorsed the number mysticism of Johannes 
Francus Offusius who set the earth-sun distance at 576 earth diameters, the square of 24 
(II, 421-22). 
27 Johannes Kepler, Astronomia nova seu Physica coelestis, tradita commentariis de 
motibus stellae Martis (Prague, 1609), Gesammelte Werke, Max Caspar (ed.) (18 vols.; 
Munich, 1937-59), III,  121, 461-62. 366  Ann Blair 
tion  were taken in his  own hand (X, 196ff. and 283ff.).28 Schofield suggests 
that Tycho's  later  version  of the test was due to his faulty  recollection  of 
what had impressed  him about Copernicus's  model for Mars:  when he 
found  that the positions  of Mars  corresponded  better  to the Copernican 
than  to the  Ptolemaic  model,  Tycho  erroneously  assumed  that  the  parallax 
he had observed  earlier  also supported  Copernicus  over Ptolemy.29  On 
this interpretation  Tycho  would  have  rather  surprisingly  confused  a weak 
argument  from the agreement  of parameters  with a much stronger  kind 
of empirical  test. 
Whatever  the observational  basis for the two versions  of the story,30 
the shift cannot  be understood  without  reference  to the development  of 
Tycho's  cosmological  commitments.  In the early  1580s  Tycho  was simply 
opposed  to heliocentrism  and  used  his observation  of the parallax  of Mars 
as one of his strongest  arguments  against  the Copernican  system.  But by 
1588 Tycho had also settled on an alternative  to heliocentrism  in his 
geoheliocentric  model, which, like the Copernican  system,  placed Mars 
closer  to the earth  than  the sun at opposition.  This arrangement,  with its 
overlapping  spheres  of Mars  and the sun, was possible  only after  Tycho 
had abandoned  his belief in the solidity of the celestial  spheres.  Tycho 
was thus forced  to abandon  his first account  of the parallax  of Mars,  as 
it would infirm  not only the Copernican  but also his own cosmological 
model,  to which he was deeply  attached. 
So if Tycho's  second  and  final  account  of his observation  of the paral- 
lax of Mars31  supported  his own system,  by the same token it involved 
abandoning  one of his strongest  arguments  against  Copernicus.  In order 
to maintain  the symmetry  of his carefully  constructed  letter to Peucer, 
Tycho  used  his discussion  of the parallax  of Mars  to refute  the Ptolemaic 
system  and offered  another  refutation  of the Copernican  system  instead. 
Comets, Tycho pointed out, do not display retrograde  motion. As he 
explained in the De mundi aetherei phaenomenis however, they behave 
like  planets  in many  ways.  Located  in the ethereal  region  with  the planets, 
comets  travel  around  the sun  just beyond  the sphere  of Venus.  Their  orbit 
is freer than the planets'  but still roughly  similar:  "It is probable  that 
comets,  since  they do not have perfect  bodies  designed  to last forever  ... 
do not observe  in their orbits  such an absolute  and constant  continuity 
and equality,  but only like mimes emulate in some way the uniform 
regularity  of the planets,  but  do not attain  it in all things"  (IV, 162).  Since, 
28  Dreyer,  Tychonis Brahe opera omnia,  I,  xxxix-xl.  Dreyer  had  earlier accepted 
Kepler's account in Tycho Brahe, 179, but changed his opinion on the basis of Tycho's 
notebooks. Owen Gingerich, "Dreyer and Tycho's World System," Sky and Telescope,  64 
(1982),  138-40. 
29  Schofield, 66-68. 
30 A close reading of the notebooks might elucidate this problem. 
31 Tycho repeats the argument to Rothmann (VI,  179) and Hagecius (VII,  199-200) 
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although  planet-like,  the comets  do not display  retrograde  motion,  Tycho 
argued  that the stations  and retrogradations  that we see in the motion  of 
the planets  must  really  be theirs  rather  than  due  to the motion  of the earth 
as Copernicus  claims:  "In addition  the two comets which were carried 
near  the opposition  of the sun showed  clearly  enough  that the earth  does 
not in fact revolve  annually,  since  the motion  of the earth  did not detract 
in any way from  their  regular  and established  motion,  as happens  to the 
planets  which  Copernicus  believes  move  backward  because  of the motion 
of the earth"  (VII, 130). In short,  if the earth  revolved  annually  around 
the sun, why would the comets  not also display  retrograde  motion? 
Tycho's  argument  is not entirely  consistent:  in his system  no less than 
Copernicus's  the stations  and retrogradations  of bodies  revolving  around 
the sun are due to the position  of the observer  on earth,  which is either 
stationary  while  the sun is not (geoheliocentrism),  or in motion  while  the 
sun is immobile  (heliocentrism).  Therefore  comets  that revolved  like the 
planets  around  the sun would be expected  to display  retrograde  motion 
in both systems.  Furthermore,  even  if Tycho  did not see this fundamental 
flaw in his argument,  he might have noticed that it affected  only the 
annual,  not the daily rotation  of the earth.  Nevertheless,  Tycho clearly 
believed  that his argument  from the behavior  of comets  was forceful.  In 
a letter to Magini, professor  of mathematics  at Bologna, dated 1590, 
Tycho  described  his arguments  about  comets.  The Copernican  system,  he 
proclaimed,  with its "triple  motion of the earth will be unquestionably 
refuted,  not simply  theologically  and  physically,  but even  mathematically, 
even though  Copernicus  hoped  that he had proposed  to mathematicians 
sufficiently  mathematical  statements  to which  they  could  not object"  (VII, 
295). Tycho  was especially  proud  to announce  a refutation  of Copernicus 
on his own ground,  responding  to the latter's  remark  in the preface  to De 
revolutionibus  that "mathematics  is written  for mathematicians."32 
IV. The evidence  of Copernicus's  parameters 
At a loss for other  "mathematical"  proofs,  Tycho  most  often  attacked 
Copernican  parameters  and observations.  When  taken  individually,  none 
of the discrepancies  he catalogued  actually disproved  the Copernican 
system,  which  could have  been  modified  in each detail  as necessary  to fit 
his new data;  yet Tycho  clearly  hoped  to discredit  heliocentrism  by point- 
ing to the unreliability  of Copernicus's  numbers,  as if it logically  entailed 
that the Copernican  system  could not be sustained. 
Tycho  never  advocated  simple  empiricism  nor  claimed  a direct  deriva- 
tion of his geoheliocentric  model  from  observations  free  of "hypotheses." 
This is clear from his position  on the famous  call by the contemporary 
32 Copernicus, f. iiij v. In this passage a "mathematical"  argument for Tycho seems to 
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French philosopher Peter Ramus for an "astronomy without hypotheses" 
modelled on the strict empiricism of the Egyptians. In a letter to Roth- 
mann sixteen years later, Tycho reports that in 1571 Ramus had suggested 
to him over a meal one day in Augsburg that he attempt to constitute 
an astronomy "through logical reasons without hypotheses." But Tycho 
"resisted him, showing that without hypotheses the celestial phenomena 
cannot be reduced to a certain science nor dispensed with so as to be 
understood" (VI, 88). He concluded that Ramus, although "gifted with 
a perspicacious intelligence and a lover of truth if any there was, did not 
seem to have penetrated deeply into this art [of astronomy]" (VI,  88). 
Hypotheses are necessary because "they show the measure of apparent 
motion through a circle and other figures which arithmetic solves into 
numbers" (VI, 89). Although in principle both the Copernican and the 
Tychonic hypotheses could be modified to accommodate more precise 
observations, once he had settled on his geoheliocentric system for the 
reasons outlined above, Tycho used Copernicus's errors in describing the 
motions of the earth/sun,33 moon and planets, the positions of the stars 
and the precession of the equinoxes as evidence that Copernicus's inade- 
quate standards of observation and derivation could not be trusted to 
yield a valid cosmological system. 
After his first mention of errors in Copernicus's stellar positions in 
1577, which he had meekly attributed to the errors of the ancient observa- 
tions or of those who transcribed  them, Tycho discovered more and more 
discrepancies between the Copernican parameters and his own observa- 
tions, which he increasingly blamed on Copernicus himself and his poor 
observational practice. Copernicus's errors in predicting the course of the 
sun were the first that Tycho examined closely.  In  1580 already, in a 
letter to the Bohemian physician-astronomer  Thaddeus Hagecius, Tycho 
complained: 
The calculations  of Alphonso  and  Copernicus  sometimes  differ  from  [my]  obser- 
vations  [of the course  of the sun]  by half  of one degree,  or at times  more....  The 
motion  of the center  of the sun's eccentric  in its epicycle  is very different  than 
our  predecessors  and  even  Copernicus  himself  determined,  so that  the  eccentricity 
of the sun is now 205', that is 13' greater  than what Copernicus  thought.  The 
apogee of the sun is near 5? of Capricorn,  much farther  ahead of what the 
hypotheses  of Copernicus  say. (VII, 60) 
In a letter to Rothmann in 1587, Tycho could provide an explanation for 
these errors. Indeed "the fact that the eccentricity of the sun, its apogee 
and entire course had come to disagree so enormously from Copernicus's 
hypotheses in a short number of years" (VI,  103) led him to suspect an 
33 Given his commitment to the immobility of the earth Tycho discusses Copernicus's 
motion of the earth as the motion of the sun. The two are interchangeable  in the geocentric 
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error in Copernicus's measurement of the polar altitude of Frauenburg. 
Tycho sent one of his assistants to Copernicus's home in Prussia with 
a load of precision equipment to  measure the elevation with his own 
instruments. The observations yielded a polar elevation of  54022'1  for 
Frauenburg, a value in excess of Copernicus's by "about three minutes" 
(VI,  103). Tycho concluded from Copernicus's writings that the latter 
"had probably  not avoided the effects of refraction at his inclined location 
and perhaps also had not  taken parallax into  account" (VI,  103). By 
Tycho's standards, Copernicus had failed to fulfill the responsibilities of 
the careful observer. 
As a mitigating circumstance, Tycho did recognize that Copernicus's 
tools, such as the parallactic instrument which was brought back for him 
from Frauenburg, were primitive. Laying out new ground rules for the 
observational astronomer, Tycho wrote in his Apologetica responsio ad 
Craigum Scotum (1589): 
If you have  made  your  rulers  out of wood,  you accomplish  nothing  because  they 
are not well enough  suited  to fine divisions  and are not free from  all change;  if 
you have made  them of metal,  they will not suffice  unless  they are of the right 
length  and size to allow  for the divisions  that yield  minutes;  but when  they have 
the requisite  size, their own bulk weighs them down so that when inclined 
however  slightly  away  from  the level of the straight  line they cause  a loss of the 
sought-after  certainty,  as daily experience  has taught  me. (IV, 464) 
Tycho concluded therefore that the "rulers of wood" which Copernicus 
had made and that were given to  him by the canon of Warmia were 
"totally useless because of the instability of the material" (IV, 464).34 
In keeping with his aristocratic self-image,35  Tycho was proud to point 
out that the construction of the huge metal instruments he owned required 
considerable patronage, and he willingly granted in his letter to Peucer 
that many of his colleagues were not as fortunate as he: 
The mathematicians  of our age are nevertheless  excusable  because  they do not 
own large enough and appropriate  instruments  with which to investigate  the 
motions  of the stars,  since  their  salaries  and  all their  yearly  revenues  would  hardly 
suffice  to pay for a single  properly  built instrument.  Indeed  I know that I own 
many  instruments  each one of which  would  far surpass  in price  of construction 
the annual  salary,  even the highest,  of any university  professor.  (VII, 139) 
Thus Tycho conceded to Rothmann that if Copernicus had had at his 
disposal the fine-tuned instruments available at Uraniborg, he would have 
reached far better results (VI, 102). 
34 See the similar discussion in his Astronomiae instauratae mechanica (Wandesburg, 
1598), V, 45. 
35 See Owen Hannaway, "Laboratory  Design and the Aim of Science:  Andreas Libavius 
versus Tycho Brahe," Isis, 77 (1986), 585-610. 370  Ann Blair 
Nonetheless,  good instruments alone could not  guarantee the best 
results. Ptolemy, for example, had used instruments built at the expense 
of the "royal Egyptians" and still got results that Tycho sometimes found 
wanting in precision (VII, 259). A prerequisite for reaching good results 
even with good instruments was a commitment to observation itself which 
Copernicus  seemed to lack. Tycho's discussion of the lunar model provides 
a good example of his combined admiration and disappointment. On the 
one hand Tycho believed that Copernicus was both "correct  and ingenious 
to hypothesize that the revolutions of the moon around the earth happen 
in a concentric circle with two epicycles" and suggested to Peucer that 
the superior planets should be modelled in the same way (VII, 136). On 
the  other hand Tycho  expressed his  misgivings to  Hagecius in  1595. 
Although more elegant and probable  than Ptolemy's model, Copernicus's 
theory was not sufficient to save the phenomena: 
At the new  and  full  moons  and  both  quadratures  he obtains  in any  case  a position 
such that he does not even there  explain  all things  with the requisite  precision. 
But in the four  places  which  are  intermediate  to these,  he does  not at all save  the 
appearances,  unless  we count for nothing  the loss of one half degree  when the 
moon  is near  the mean  elongations  of the  bigger  epicycle  and  of almost  one  whole 
degree  when it is near  apogee  or perigee.  (VII, 370) 
In order to account for his observations Tycho introduced the third 
inequality of the moon, or variation.36  The problem, as Tycho explained 
in 1599 to Herwart von Hohenburg, was that Copernicus, following the 
practice of earlier astronomers, had used only three eclipse observations, 
"which do not suffice to explain the first inequality of the moon, to say 
nothing of the other more complicated one." Establishing new standards 
for derivation, Tycho insisted rather that it was "necessary to have more 
very accurate observations taken in different places of the eccentric or the 
major epicycle" (VIII,  161). 
Although Tycho recognized that Copernicus had simply followed a 
long-standing practice in deriving the lunar inequalities from only three 
observations, he was especially critical of this tendency of his contempo- 
raries, and of Copernicus in particular,  to rely on the authority of received 
values rather than on  their own  observations. When  determining the 
maximal lunar latitude for example, Tycho  obtained a value of  5?15', 
rather than the 5?  that Ptolemy and modern astronomers after him had 
thought to be correct. As Victor Thoren has argued, this reassessment 
played an important role in leading Tycho to his new theory of the lunar 
latitude and oscillation.37  But when he first suggested the new parameter, 
36 See Victor E. Thoren, "Tycho Brahe's Discovery of the Variation," Centaurus, 12 
(1967), 151-66. 
37 Victor E. Thoren, "An Early Instance of Deductive Discovery: Tycho Brahe's Lunar 
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his friend and correspondent Henry Brucaeus objected that the traditional 
value must be the more accurate. In his reply in 1588 Tycho lashed out 
against Brucaeus for his excessive deference to authority, but Copernicus 
once again bore the brunt of his criticism: 
The authority  of Regiomontanus,  Copernicus,  Werner,  and  others  (whoever  they 
are) does not move me on this issue, since the restoration  of astronomy  must 
derive  not from  the authority  of men,  but from  reliable  observations  and  demon- 
strations  based  on them....  Copernicus  accepted  without  change  the maximal 
latitude  of the moon from  Ptolemy  and did not try to see for himself  in the sky 
whether  it was the case or not; Copernicus  used as an excuse  the fact that fate 
had not given him the same opportunity  to see for himself  that Ptolemy  had, 
because  the obstacles  of the lunar  parallaxes  at his greater  polar  elevation  could 
not be easily  avoided  as they  could  in Alexandria,  which  Copernicus  makes  clear 
in his own words  in De revolutionibus  book 4, chapter  15. (VII, 152-53)38 
In this instance Tycho agreed with Copernicus's assessment of Ptole- 
my's superior observational conditions and results. Tycho did not replace 
Ptolemy's value of the maximal lunar latitude with his own, but rather 
used it as "correct  in his time" and concluded from the difference  between 
his own observations and Ptolemy's values that there had been a secular 
shift in the maximal latitude of the moon similar to that in the angle of 
the obliquity of the ecliptic (VII,  153). Although  Tycho later rejected 
this particular  interpretation  and concluded that the important difference 
between "his and Ptolemy's determinations was the phase of the moon 
rather than the era of observation,"39  he maintained that the deviation of 
Ptolemy's value from his own "by a quarter of a degree was not the result 
of a fault of instrumentation  or observation" (VII, 153). Copernicus's real 
mistake, then, was not so much that he trusted Ptolemy's value but rather 
that he did not even try to make his own observations. Tycho had little 
sympathy for Copernicus's argument that his northerly location created 
insurmountable obstacles for observing the moon. Despite his own far 
worse conditions, as Tycho reminded Kepler in a letter in 1599, he had 
obtained reliable results from even more difficult observations: "Though 
it [Mercury] rarely passes beyond the sun's rays [which make it invisible] 
and the sphere is more inclined in our Denmark than in Frauenburg in 
Prussia where Copernicus lived, and the sea around our island creates 
more fogs than the Vistula: nonetheless we have frequently made accurate 
38 The reference is to De revolutionibus,  book IV, chapter 15: "Because of the obstacle 
of the lunar parallaxes, fortune did not give us the opportunity to test, as it gave Ptolemy, 
that the greatest latitude of the moon, conforming to the angle of intersection of its orb 
and the ecliptic, is 5?."  Copernicus, f. 117r. 
39 Victor E. Thoren, "Tycho and Kepler on the Lunar Theory," Publications of the 
Astronomical Society of the Pacific, 114 (1967), 484. 372  Ann Blair 
observations  even of Mercury,  a most difficult  planet to follow" (VIII, 
208).40 
Tycho's  own attitude  toward  the observations  of the ancients  is inter- 
esting and complex.  On the one hand he clearly  appreciated  Ptolemy's 
skill as an observational  astronomer,  as in the case of the lunar  latitude. 
Tycho also expressed  great respect  for the observations  of Hipparchus 
(VII, 373-74;  VIII, 104). On the other hand, however,  Tycho was also 
willing to consider  ancient  observations  erroneous  by a certain  margin 
when they seemed  unreasonable.  For example,  when Tycho planned  an 
expedition  to Alexandria  to measure  the polar elevation  there, he told 
Magini  in a letter  dated 1590  that he wanted  to show that the "elevation 
of the pole had not noticeably  changed  over the intervening  centuries, 
unless  perhaps  Ptolemy  erred  by a very few minutes"  (VII, 298). Intent 
on refuting  the suggestion  by Domenicus  Maria  of Novara  that latitudes 
had changed  over the centuries  and that the pole had shifted toward 
the zenith since Ptolemy's  time, Tycho would have concluded  that any 
difference  of "a very  few minutes"  between  Ptolemy's  and  his own obser- 
vations  reflected  an error  on Ptolemy's  part rather  than a secular  shift. 
In fact the expedition  never  took place.41 
The estimation  of the rate of the precession  of the equinoxes  offers 
another  example  of Tycho's  attitudes  toward  ancient  observations  since 
it relies  crucially  on earlier  results.  Copernicus  had proceeded  with total 
confidence  in the accuracy  of all available  observations  and,  when  compar- 
ing them  with his own, arrived  at a figure  for the rate  of precession  which 
was both faster  than Ptolemy's  and itself irregular.  It was to account  for 
this irregularity  that Copernicus  introduced  the libration  of the third 
motion  of the earth,  which,  of all the motions  that Copernicus  had attrib- 
uted to the earth,  Tycho had always  found particularly  useless (otiosus, 
VIII, 45). 
In 1595 in a discussion  of the calendar  with Isaac Pontanus,  royal 
historian  of Denmark,  Tycho  justified  his determination  of the length  of 
the year over the past few centuries  from its length in the last hundred 
years,  on the grounds  that the length of the year does not change  with 
the precession  of the equinoxes  as quickly as Copernicus  had claimed. 
Tycho  reveals  here  how he established  this fact to his satisfaction.  Unlike 
the "lax and credulous"  Copernicus,  Tycho compared  his results with 
40  Tycho is referring  to Copernicus's complaints in De revolutionibus,  book V, chapter 
30, on Mercury: "Of course the ancients showed us this way of examining the path of this 
star [Mercury], but they enjoyed a more serene sky, where no doubt the Nile, as they say, 
does not exhale vapors like the Vistula where we are. Nature has denied us this advantage 
since we live in a more rigorous climate where calm weather is rarer and in addition it is 
more rarely possible to  see  Mercury because of  the  great inclination of  the  sphere." 
Copernicus, f. 369r. 
41  William Norlind, "Tycho Brahe et ses rapports avec l'Italie," Scientia, 49 (1955), 
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only the most trustworthy of those of the ancients and as a consequence 
found precession to be smaller and more regular than Copernicus had: 
Although  the  quantity  of the  equinoctial  or  solar  year  that  I use  for  these  centuries 
was derived  only from an epoch one hundred  years  ago, from  the observations 
of Regiomontanus  and his student  Walther,  deliberately,  so that I avoided  the 
labyrinths  of inequality  which Copernicus  and others introduced  (as I see it) 
because  of their  excessive  credulity  and  laxity:  nonetheless  if a proper  comparison 
is made with the observations  of centuries  earlier,  especially  with those which 
are deserving  of our trust  beyond  a doubt  (such as I judge  those of Hipparchus 
above  all others,  who most  diligently  attended  to the appearances  of both  the sun 
and  the moon),  the annual  quantity  defined  by us falls  short  by very  few,  possibly 
5 or 6, seconds  and thus in no way affects  the determination  of the years.  But 
my observations  when applied  to the best of the ancient  ones show that the 
disparity  in the quantity  of the year and the motion  of the fixed stars  is not as 
great  nor of such great  moment  as astronomers  think.  (VII, 373-74) 
The key to Tycho's approach to the precession was a circumspect attitude 
toward ancient parameters  rather than the excessively confident trust that 
Tycho attributed in Copernicus not only to credulity but also to a certain 
"laxity," a reluctance to make countless diligent observations as Tycho 
had. 
Tycho was equally distressed by Copernicus's planetary positions. He 
found "no small deviation from the measure of the sky in the latitudes" 
of Mercury and the three superior planets (VIII,  161). As  for Venus, 
Tycho told Kepler, its eccentricity was much smaller than Ptolemy or 
Copernicus had thought and its apogee was not fixed with respect to 
the stars as Copernicus had believed, but now had already reached the 
beginning of Cancer (VIII, 45). Although more conciliatory in the early 
stages of his observational  project, Tycho still reported errors  by Coperni- 
cus for each of the superior planets in a 1590 letter to Hagecius: 
The hypothesis  of Copernicus  is nonetheless  closer  [than  Ptolemy's]  to the mea- 
sure of the heavens,  except  that in Jupiter  it deviates  sometimes  by more than 
one degree,  and  in Saturn  up to one half of a degree.  I have  not found  until  now 
that  Copernicus  committed  a greater  discrepancy  from  the sky  in the two slowest 
planets,  though  for Mars the discrepancy  reaches  sometimes  three degrees,  or 
even a little more....  Our observations,  compared  with the ancient  ones will 
provide  some day, God willing,  a more  exact  correspondence  with the celestial 
appearances  of the planets.  (VII, 269) 
Five years later, writing to Hagecius again, Tycho sounded more exas- 
perated: 
In constituting  the apogees  of the other  planets  (not  to speak  of the eccentricities, 
which he derived  too confidently  from Ptolemy)  the great  Copernicus,  who is 
never  enough  praised,  erred  in no small  way....  In the numbers  of Copernicus 
the apogee  of Mars  is more  than five degrees  beyond  where  the measure  of the 374  Ann Blair 
heavens  demands,  and  the  eccentricity,  which  he made  smaller  than  the  Ptolemaic 
value  (perhaps  so that  he could  with  more  probability  support  his own  speculation 
about  the motion  of the earth  and the changed  eccentricity  of the sun) is so far 
from  being  smaller  that it is necessary  to make  the same  rather  barely  larger  (by 
a very  few minutes  though)  only  to satisfy  the phenomena  of Mars  in all respects. 
(VII, 370) 
Tycho concluded the tirade with an explicit statement of the argument 
underlying most of his parametric complaints: "And on the basis of this 
experimentum alone, the position of Copernicus on the motion of the 
earth and the immobility of the sun is weakened" (VII, 370).42  In a similar 
way Tycho argued with Rothmann that "the fact that the eccentricity of 
Mars by no means corresponds to what the Copernican theories require 
is a strong argument for their weakness" (VI, 336). Tycho concluded with 
the implication that it was Copernicus's faulty parameters  which had led 
him to doubt the veracity of the heliocentric system: "the fact that his 
hypotheses are less correct [than Ptolemy's] causes me no small hesita- 
tion" (VI, 336). 
Tycho's litany of criticisms of Copernicus's parameters and observa- 
tions is in part a contribution  to his ongoing argument  against the Coperni- 
can system as a whole and especially its heliocentrism. Although Tycho 
would no doubt have recognized that each particular discrepancy could 
be resolved without affecting the hypothesis of the motion of the earth, 
to tarnish the Copernican system even if only by association by pointing 
to its numerous empirical flaws was, Tycho hoped, to make the Tychonic 
system more appealing. Given the otherwise wide acclaim of sixteenth- 
century astronomers for the  Copernican parameters, to  which  Tycho 
himself had contributed as a young lecturer, these specifically parametric 
criticisms are unique and proved to have a more enduring impact than 
Tycho's system itself.43 
V. Tycho's legacy 
In addition to undermining the Copernican system in a loose way, 
Tycho's critique of Copernicus's parameters served as the background 
against which Tycho  defined his own,  new standards of  astronomical 
practice. Tycho would certainly not have attacked Copernicus's parame- 
ters had he not already been particularly  sensitive, for whatever combina- 
tion of factors, to numerical accuracy. Nonetheless it is probable that 
Tycho's constantly renewed awareness  of Copernicus's shortcomings con- 
42 Experimentum  here denotes a refined observation to be used as the basis for a choice 
between theories. For more on the use of the term in this period see Charles B. Schmitt, 
"Experience and Experiment: A  Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's in de 
Motu," Studies in the Renaissance, 16 (1969), 80-138. 
43 See C. Doris Hellman, "Was Tycho Brahe as Influential as He Thought?" British 
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tributed  to a more explicit  realization  and discussion  of his own sugges- 
tions for "restoring"  astronomy. 
Thus,  for  example,  Tycho  called  for  a closer  consideration  of the effects 
of refraction.  Refraction  had probably  distorted  Copernicus's  estimate  of 
the polar  elevation  of Frauenburg,  and,  as Tycho  commented  in a number 
of places,  refraction  also  caused  Copernicus  to underestimate  the obliquity 
of the ecliptic  by three or four minutes  (VII, 280-81;  VIII, 197-98).  Al- 
though  Tycho  himself  believed  that  refraction  was caused  by atmospheric 
vapors  that disappeared  above  a certain  altitude,44  for all observations  at 
an altitude of less than 45?  at least Tycho insisted that refraction be taken 
into account.  He drew up tables of refraction  to that end which, albeit 
unpublished,  circulated  as an appendix  to his catalogue  of 1000 stars  to 
Tycho's  potential  patrons.45 
Tycho also laid down clear rules for the construction  of accurate 
instruments-to be made only of metal and of sufficient  size to bear 
graduations  down to the minute. Tycho was proud to have devised a 
method for "subdividing  degrees  of arc through  the use of transversal 
points  and  of tiny slit sights  on alidades,"  so proud  in fact  that  he accused 
Rothmann  of stealing  it from  him without  acknowledgment.46  As well as 
a bid  for  patronage,  Tycho's  description  of his instruments  and  installation 
at Uraniborg in his Astronomiae  instauratae mechanica constituted a nor- 
mative depiction  of how astronomy  should be practised,  and included 
detailed  specifications  of his different  instruments,  complete  with  illustra- 
tions. 
Tycho's  criticisms  of Copernicus  especially  emphasized  what  could  be 
called his "astronomical  method."  Tycho's most common criticism  of 
Copernicus's  method  was that he relied  excessively  and too confidently 
on received  parameters,  notably  Ptolemy's.  Tycho  insisted  rather  that  the 
sky was  the only guide  to be followed.  Tycho  himself,  however,  was  guilty 
of the same  offense,  although  he certainly  would  never  have admitted  it. 
Tycho  accepted  without  recomputation  the traditional  value  for the solar 
parallax  for example.  Although  Tycho's  final  verdict  on the relative  posi- 
tions of Mars  and  the sun favored  the Copernican  and  Tychonic  systems, 
it rested  less on solid empirical  ground-Tycho claimed  to have found  a 
greater  parallax  for Mars  than  for the sun  while  using  an excessively  large 
value for the latter-than  on Tycho's own cosmological  commitments. 
But Tycho's great reputation  for observational  accuracy,  which in this 
case was hardly  warranted,  turned  his "test"  from the parallax  of Mars 
into a powerful  argument  in favor  of heliocentrism;  long after  his death 
44  Dreyer, Tycho Brahe, 336. 
45 Ibid.,  265. 
46  Bruce T. Moran, "Christoph Rothmann, the Copernican Theory and Institutional 
and Technical Influences on the Criticism of Aristotelian Cosmology," Sixteenth-Century 
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his "observation"  of the greater  parallax  of Mars  was cited with unques- 
tioning  approval.47 
Where  Tycho really  did differ  from Copernicus  was not so much in 
his  rejection  of authority,  which  was  sometimes  more  pretense  than  reality, 
but rather  in his insistence  on the difficulty  of observational  astronomy. 
Tycho had attacked  Copernicus  for relying  on too few observations  for 
his derivations.  Three  eclipse  observations  alone could not establish  the 
first lunar inequality;  furthermore,  as Tycho warned  Magini in 1598, 
"neither  do three  observations  suffice  to explain  the apogees  and  eccentri- 
cities  [of  the planets]  as astronomers  in imitation  of Ptolemy  and  Coperni- 
cus have in vain believed  until now" (VIII, 121).  Tycho on the contrary 
expressed  his dissatisfaction,  in a letter  to Kepler  in 1598,  with  the number 
of observations  that even he had accumulated  by the end of his years  in 
Hveen: "if truer measurements  of the eccentrities  of each planet were 
available,  such as those that I have at my disposal  gathered  over many 
years,  they  could  allow  a more  accurate  judgment  in these  matters"  (VIII, 
44). He concluded  to Maestlin  later that year that too little was known 
of the motions  of the planets  to support  a hypothesis:  "the  double  inequali- 
ties of the planets,  which [astronomers]  explain  by a double  eccentric  or 
epicycle,  are not yet well enough  unravelled"  (VIII, 53). 
Tycho  was  clearly  willing  to be patient.  He had  painstakingly  observed 
Mercury  whenever  possible  despite  the difficult  conditions  at Uraniborg. 
He noted  in his preface  to his astronomical  letters  how slow his work  had 
been:  if Mercury  was notoriously  hard to see, "even  observations  of the 
three slow-moving  planets,  which [astronomers]  call superior,  sufficient 
to restore  their  motions  appropriately,  require  no small  amount  of time" 
(VI, 20). As a consequence,  Tycho recognized  that some parts  of astron- 
omy would perhaps  never  be completed.  The motion of the fixed stars 
due to the precession  of the equinoxes  was a particularly  difficult  topic 
since "it is not reasonable  that the inequality  be at all noticeable  in the 
stars in the life of one man" and Tycho conceded  to the Landgrave  of 
Hesse  in 1587:  "I believe  that an exact  knowledge  of the apparent  motion 
of the eighth  sphere  is hardly  attainable  for any mortal"  (VI, 73). 
Finally,  Tycho  stressed  the  need  to verify  observations  and  derivations. 
Especially  for observations  of the fixed stars "Ptolemy  did not use in 
verifying  them  the diligence  and  precision  which  were  necessary,  and  still 
less did Copernicus"  (VII, 268). Although Dreyer was "disappointed" 
with Tycho's  own verifications  and care in determining  the positions  of 
the stars  outside  the ecliptic  in his star  catalogues,  Tycho is noted  for his 
"practice  of using  redundant  data  and  admitting  scatter  into his results."48 
47  Schofield, 69. 
48 J. L. E. Dreyer, "Tycho Brahe's Catalogue of Stars," Observatory,  40 (1917), 233. 
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Tycho also suspected  that in determining  the eccentricity  and apogee  of 
Mars,  "since  in both cases  the error  was perceptible  enough,  Copernicus 
had arranged  his results to fit his assumptions  rather  than testing the 
latter  sufficiently  against  indubitable  observations"  (VII, 292-93). 
Tycho's  novel  appreciation  of the arduous  and  slow process  of collect- 
ing and  then using  good observations  may have  prevented  him from  ever 
presenting  his own system  in detail.  As Thoren  has noted, however,  the 
models  which Tycho did complete,  for the motions  of the moon and the 
sun  for  example,  constitute  examples  of empirical  derivation  of the highest 
caliber.49  No doubt  Tycho's  critique  of Copernicus  grew  out of his com- 
monplace  rejection  ofheliocentrism  on physical,  scriptural,  and  cosmolog- 
ical grounds,  and was fueled  in part  by his self-interest  in promoting  his 
own geoheliocentric  system;  nonetheless  in his unique  attack  on Coperni- 
cus's observational  practice  and derivation  of parameters,  Tycho  became 
aware  of the shortcomings  of his predecessors  and formulated  explicitly 
his own requirements  for the restoration  of astronomy.  With  a keen  sense 
of the commitment  and constant effort required  of whomever  would 
restore  the discipline,  Tycho called for better  instruments,  more careful 
and diligent  observations  and greater  prudence  and patience  in a directly 
empirical  derivation  of models.  Drawing  on this refined  program  of astro- 
nomical  practice,  Kepler  in turn  would  refine  the notion  of astronomical 
theory,  its nature,  development,  and sources.50 
Princeton  University. 
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